Molyneux's question

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):441-464 (2005)
What philosophical issue or issues does Molyneux’s question raise? I concentrate on two. First, are there any properties represented in both touch and vision? Second, for any such common perceptible, is it represented in the same way in each, so that the two senses support a single concept of that property? I show that there is space for a second issue here, describe its precise relations to Molyneux’s question, and argue for its philosophical significance. I close by arguing that Gareth Evans conflated the two issues, and thereby provide further grounds for distinguishing them
Keywords Assumption  Epistemology  Perception  Question  Campbell, John  Evans, Gareth  Locke, John  Molyneux, William
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2005.10716598
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