In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2012)
Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
|Keywords||Physicalism Interpretation Computationalism Dualism Metaphor Consciousness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Non-Reductive Physicalism?A. D. Smith - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists.Peter Forrest - 1996 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism.Richard Brown - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):47-69.
Wittgenstein and Physicalism.Jim Hopkins - 1974 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:121 - 146.
Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.
The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism.Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
Dualism, Physicalism and the Parmenidean Dogma.Joseph Wayne Smith - 1985 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 12 (July-September):261-266.
Beyond Physicalism and Dualism? Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism and the Philosophy of Mind.David Ludwig - 2011 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 3 (1):245-257.
A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism.Warren Shrader - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):257-271.
Added to index2012-10-08
Total downloads188 ( #23,148 of 2,158,934 )
Recent downloads (6 months)23 ( #16,162 of 2,158,934 )
How can I increase my downloads?