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Routledge and Kegan Paul (1980)
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| Abstract |
This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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| Keywords | Act |
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| Buy the book | $93.89 new (27% off) Amazon page |
| ISBN(s) | 0710004524 9780710004529 |
| DOI | 10.2307/2219118 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.
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2009-09-11
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287 ( #15,580 of 2,293,920 )
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