Actions and accidents

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325 (2015)

Abstract

In acting intentionally, it is no accident that one is doing what one intends to do. In this paper, I ask how to account for this non-accidentality requirement on intentional action. I argue that, for systematic reasons, the currently prevailing view of intentional action – the Causal Theory of Action – is ill-equipped to account for it. I end by proposing an alternative account, according to which an intention is a special kind of cause, one to which it is essential that it represents its effect.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.

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