Agency and Actions


Authors
Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College
Abstract
Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics then is involved with questions of moral psychology whose answers admit a kind of richness in the life of human beings from which the philosophy of mind may ordinarily prescind. Philosophy of mind, insofar as it treats the phenomenon of agency as one facet of the phenomenon of mentality, has been more concerned with how there can be ‘mental causation’ than with any details of a story of human motivation or of the place of evaluative commitments within such a story.
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DOI 10.1017/s1358246100008614
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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Naturalism in Question.R. Neta - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):657-663.
2003.A. R. Mele - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.
Davidsonian Causalism and Wittgensteinian Anti-Causalism: A Rapprochement.Matthieu Queloz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:153-72.
Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
What Reasoning Might Be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.

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