Walter Horn
Brown University (PhD)
A proof is offered according to which if a psychological premise held by many diverse philosophers through the centuries to the effect that any represented physical property will be held to be exemplified unless some conflicting physical property is simultaneously represented is considered to be necessary, then there are physical objects in every possible world.
Keywords metaphysics, representation, physicality
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DOI 10.2307/2107618
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