Acta Analytica 33 (3):295-309 (2018)

Matjaz Potrc
University of Ljubljana
Terry Horgan
University of Arizona
Vojko Strahovnik
University of Ljubljana
We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues involve several inter-related kinds of epistemic rationality in belief fixation. Other “habits of mind” pertinent to belief fixation constitute ancillary epistemic virtues. Finally, we discuss the relationship between both kinds of virtues, offering a unified account of epistemic virtuousness.
Keywords epistemic virtue  rationality  truth  epistemic agency  agency  phenomenology of belief
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-018-0349-4
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Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):970-973.
Epistemic Virtue.James A. Montmarquet - 1987 - Mind 96 (384):482-497.

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