Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem

Theoria 16 (40):95-116 (2001)
Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various <blockquote> [1] </blockquote> other papers of mine (some collaborative) that bear on this topic
Keywords Compatibilism  Context  Exclusion  Mental Causation  Metaphysics  Lewis, D
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Michael Baumgartner (2009). Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
Jack C. Lyons (2006). In Defense of Epiphenomenalism. Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):76-794.

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