Conventional Wisdom Reconsidered

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):145-162 (2016)
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Abstract

Lepore and Stone seek to replace the rationality-based Gricean picture of coordination between speaker and hearer with one leaning more strongly on the roles of convention and speaker knowledge while doing away with conversational implicature. Focusing on the phenomena of indirect speech acts, asymmetric conjunction, and scalar inferencing, I argue that the case for abandoning implicature as an analytical tool is not ultimately compelling. I seek further to demonstrate the utility of the classical Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated in the construction of an intuitively appealing approach to the perennial question of how to distinguish lying from misleading inside and outside the legal domain.

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Citations of this work

Lying and What is Said.Massimiliano Vignolo - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-30.
On Imagination and Convention. Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language. [REVIEW]Ricardo Mena - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (146):133-151.

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