Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716 (2021)
AbstractIn this paper, we first briefly survey the main responses to the challenge that experimental philosophy poses to the method of cases, given the common assumption that the latter is crucially based on intuitive judgments about cases. Second, we discuss two of the most popular responses in more detail: the expertise defense and the mischaracterization objection. Our take on the expertise defense is that the available empirical data do not support the claim that professional philosophers enjoy relevant expertise in their intuitive judgments about cases. In contrast, the mischaracterization objection seems considerably more promising than its largely negative reception has suggested. We argue that the burden of proof is thus on philosophers who still hold that the method of cases crucially relies on intuitive judgments about cases. Finally, we discuss whether conceptual engineering provides an alternative to the method of cases in light of the challenge from experimental philosophy. We argue that this is not clearly the case, because conceptual engineering also requires descriptive information about the concepts it aims to improve. However, its primarily normative perspective on our concepts makes it largely orthogonal to the challenge from experimental philosophy, and it can also benefit from the empirical methods of the latter.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?Sally Haslanger - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):31–55.
Citations of this work
Intuitive Expertise in Moral Judgments.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359.
Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Similar books and articles
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Intuitions About Cases as Evidence (for How We Should Think).James Andow - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases.John Turri - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A companion to experimental philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 337-348.
Experimental Philosophy of Science.Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):507–521.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Who's Afraid of Trolleys?Antti Kauppinen - 2019 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Lontoo, Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta:
Thought Experiments, Real Experiments, and the Expertise Objection.Christopher Hitchcock - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):205-218.
Experimental Epistemology and "Gettier" Cases.John Turri - 2019 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 199-217.
Persistent Bias in Expert Judgments About Free Will and Moral Responsibility: A Test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.
Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy.Avner Baz - 2017 - Oxford University Press.