Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351 (2013)
Authors
Terry Horgan
University of Arizona
Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics And Political Science
Abstract
We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (Synthese 160:97–101, 2008) has leveled at other arguments for thirdism
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9316-9
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References found in this work BETA

Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.
Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection.Frank Arntzenius - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):356-370.
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.

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