How (not) to react to experimental philosophy

Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):447-480 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper, I am going to offer a reconstruction of a challenge to intuition-based armchair philosophy that has been put forward by experimental philosophers of a restrictionist stripe, which I will call the 'master argument'. I will then discuss a number of popular objections to this argument and explain why they either fail to cast doubt on its first, empirical premise or do not go deep enough to make for a lasting rebuttal. Next, I will consider two more promising objections, the grounding objection and the expertise objection, which aim at the second, epistemic premise of the argument. Against this background, I will then suggest what I call 'conservative restrictionism' as the most reasonable default reaction to the experimentalist challenge, which is a combination of the two views of local restrictionism and methodological conservativism
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DOI 10.1080/09515089.2010.505878
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References found in this work BETA
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

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