Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359 (2022)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings suggesting that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well- known biases of judgment and decision-making among expert ethicists and laypeople. We found that even expert ethicists are affected by some of these biases, but also that they enjoy a slight advantage over laypeople in some cases. We discuss the implications of these results for the expertise defence, and conclude that they still do not support the defence as it is typically presented in (moral) philosophy.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2021.1890162 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect.Philippa Foot - 1967 - Oxford Review 5:5-15.
Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
View all 38 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.
Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Philosophers' Linguistic Expertise: A Psycholinguistic Approach to the Expertise Objection Against Experimental Philosophy.Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt & Aurélie Herbelot - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-33.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.Julia Driver - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619-644.
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning.Albert Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
The Ineffable and the Incalculable: G. E. Moore on Ethical Expertise.Ben Eggleston - 2005 - In Lisa Rasmussen (ed.), Ethics Expertise: History, Contemporary Perspectives, and Applications. Springer. pp. 89–102.
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.
Experimental Philosophy and the Method of Cases.Joachim Horvath & Steffen Koch - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12716.
The Neural Basis of Intuitive and Counterintuitive Moral Judgement.Guy Kahane, Katja Wiech, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey - 2011 - Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7 (4):393-402.
Thought Experiments, Real Experiments, and the Expertise Objection.Christopher Hitchcock - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):205-218.
Utilitarian Judgments and an Intuitive Moral System: Can John Mikhail's Model Accommodate Autism and Social Emotion?Michael Klebanov - unknown
Moral Expertise: Judgment, Practice, and Analysis*: Julia Driver.Julia Driver - 2013 - Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):280-296.
Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.
Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts.David Archard - 2011 - Bioethics 25 (3):119-127.
Towards an Intuitionist Account of Moral Development.Karen Bartsch & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):546-547.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2021-04-07
Total views
50 ( #228,598 of 2,519,659 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,990 of 2,519,659 )
2021-04-07
Total views
50 ( #228,598 of 2,519,659 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,990 of 2,519,659 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads