Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):342-359 (2022)

Authors
Joachim Horvath
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Alex Wiegmann
Universität Göttingen
Abstract
According to the ‘expertise defence’, experimental findings suggesting that intuitive judgments about hypothetical cases are influenced by philosophically irrelevant factors do not undermine their evidential use in (moral) philosophy. This defence assumes that philosophical experts are unlikely to be influenced by irrelevant factors. We discuss relevant findings from experimental metaphilosophy that largely tell against this assumption. To advance the debate, we present the most comprehensive experimental study of intuitive expertise in ethics to date, which tests five well- known biases of judgment and decision-making among expert ethicists and laypeople. We found that even expert ethicists are affected by some of these biases, but also that they enjoy a slight advantage over laypeople in some cases. We discuss the implications of these results for the expertise defence, and conclude that they still do not support the defence as it is typically presented in (moral) philosophy.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2021.1890162
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.

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Citations of this work BETA

Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Philosophical Expertise Put to the Test.Samuel Schindler & Pierre Saint-Germier - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Culture and Cognitive Science.Jesse Prinz - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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