Hornsby on the phenomenology of speech
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145 (2005)
Abstract
The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.0309-7013.2005.00129.x
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