Hornsby on the phenomenology of speech

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
442 (#24,930)

6 months
32 (#40,132)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Lowenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
In defense of hearing meanings.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2967-2983.
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.

View all 42 citations / Add more citations