Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning

Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):23-32 (2009)
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Abstract

This paper argues that deflationism about truth enables us to resolve the notorious problem of intentionality—the problem (forcibly articulated by Kripke) of explaining how intrinsically dead signs, whether material or mental, are able to reach into the world and pick out specific collections of things.

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Paul Horwich
New York University

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Reference for neo-Fregeans.David E. Taylor - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11505-11536.

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