Levity

Mind 118 (471):555-581 (2009)

Abstract

In this article, the prospects of deflationism about the concept of truth are investigated. A new version of deflationism, called inferential deflationism, is articulated and defended. It is argued that it avoids the pitfalls of earlier deflationist views such as Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth and Field’s version of deflationism

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,743

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-10-10

Downloads
144 (#83,667)

6 months
1 (#386,989)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.

View all 45 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.
On the Costs of Nonclassical Logic.Volker Halbach & Carlo Nicolai - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (2):227-257.
Deflationism About Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles