Personal and sub-personal: A defence of Dennett's early distinction

Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24 (2000)
Abstract
Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti-physicalistic, anti-dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub- personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level
Keywords Consciousness  Epistemology  Metaphysics  Personal  Sub-personal  Dennett, D
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DOI 10.1080/13869790008520978
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References found in this work BETA
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
Bayesian Sensorimotor Psychology.Michael Rescorla - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (1):3-36.
At One with Our Actions, but at Two with Our Bodies.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.

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