Particularist semantic normativity

Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61 (2006)
We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.
Keywords contextual semantics  particularism  truth  systematizability  learnability  laws  holism  reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-006-1014-x
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References found in this work BETA
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Hutchinson & Co.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Transvaluationism About Vagueness: A Progress Report.Terry Horgan - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):67-94.

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