Reasons as Defaults

Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to frame a theory of reasons--what they are, how they support actions or conclusions--using the tools of default logic. After sketching the basic account of reasons as provided by defaults, I show how it can be elaborated to deal with two more complicated issues: first, situations in which the priority relation among defaults, and so reasons as well, is itself established through default reasoning; second, the treatment of undercutting defeat and exclusionary reasons. Finally, and by way of application, I show how the resulting account can shed some light on Jonathan Dancy's argument from reason holism to a form of extreme particularism in moral theory

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,466

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ethics Without Reasons?Roger Crisp - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
Particularism and Default Reasons.Pekka Väyrynen - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):53-79.
Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All.Anna Bergqvist - 2010 - British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):1-14.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Passions.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):41-53.
Turning on Default Reasons.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):55-76.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
230 (#52,318)

6 months
8 (#96,545)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Horty
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.
Grounding Nonexistence.Daniel Muñoz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):209-229.

View all 122 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A Logic for Default Reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Moral Particularism.Jonathan Dancy - 2009 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.

View all 10 references / Add more references