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Revision Revisited
Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664 (2012)
Abstract
This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.Author Profiles
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2013-10-31
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Citations of this work
Axiomatizing semantic theories of truth?Martin Fischer, Volker Halbach, Jönne Kriener & Johannes Stern - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):257-278.
Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth.Catrin Campbell-Moore, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):87-112.
References found in this work
Axiomatizing Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.
On Representing True-in-L'in L Robert L. Martin and Peter W. Woodruff.Robert L. Martin - 1984 - In Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.), Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 47.
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