Robust vagueness and the forced-March sorites paradox

Philosophical Perspectives 8:159-188 (1994)

Abstract

I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for logic, semantics, and metaphysics

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,722

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
127 (#94,645)

6 months
5 (#136,100)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Terry Horgan
University of Arizona

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Similar books and articles

Strict Finitism and the Happy Sorites.Ofra Magidor - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):471-491.
Remarks on the Current Status of the Sorites Paradox.Richard Dewitt - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17 (1):93.
Leibniz and the Sorites.Samuel Levey - 2002 - The Leibniz Review 12:25-49.
Schiffer on Vagueness.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):12–23.
Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
Just What is Vagueness?Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):19-33.
Vagueness, Realism, Language and Thought.Howard Robinson - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):83-101.