New York: Oxford University Press (2010)
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What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.



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The Nature of Paradox

This chapter defines a paradox, roughly and superficially, as an assembly of apparently reasonable considerations that engender conflicting inclinations about what to believe, and hence a form of cognitive tension. By way of illustration, it examines various philosophical paradoxes — conce... see more


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Paul Horwich
New York University

Citations of this work

The many (yet few) faces of deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
Norms and Necessity.Amie L. Thomasson - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):143-160.
Semantics and Truth.Jan Woleński - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409.

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