The Monist 89 (1):28-49 (2006)

Authors
Robert Barnard
University of Mississippi
Terry Horgan
University of Arizona
Abstract
We will here describe a conception of truth that is robust rather than deflationist, and that differs in important ways from the most familiar robust conceptions.' We will argue that this approach to truth is intrinsically and intuitively plausible, and fares very well relative to other conceptions of truth in terms of comparative theoretical benefits and costs.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science  Pluralism about truth  Correspondence Theory of Truth
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist200689132
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Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism.Nikolaj Jang Linding Lee Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
Backing as Truthmaking.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):367–383.
Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.

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