Abstract

Neuroscientific findings have often been argued to undermine notions of free will and to require far-reaching changes of our political and legal systems. Making a difference between the metaphysical notion of free will and the political notion of autonomy,Dubljevi´c (2013) argues this switchover to be mistaken. While we appreciate attention to the social limits of neuroscientific findings, we also have a twofold concern with his proposal. The first covers the nontransparent way in which he either rejects or embraces certain scientific findings, which renders the background andmotivation of his argument unclear. The second revolves around his idea of a “rational life-plan,” which, while it covers a person’s capacity to conform to social and external factors, misses out what it means to act for a reason or be the source of one’s actions. Revisiting the example of former addict Tommy McHugh and invoking the example of a resigned addict, we present the idea of an “autonomous life-plan,” which is metaphysically sound and practically relevant.