- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
The result model of precedent
Legal Theory 10 (1):19-31 (2004)
Abstract
The result model of precedent holds that a legal precedent controls a fortiori cases—those cases, that is, that are at least as strong for the winning side of the precedent as the precedent case itself. This paper defends the result model against some objections by Larry Alexander, drawing on ideas from the field of Artificial Intelligence and Law in order to define an appropriate strength ordering for casesAuthor's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- journals.cambridge.org (no proxy)
- journals.cambridge.org [2] (no proxy)
- journals.cambridge.org [3] (no proxy)
- journals.cambridge.org [4] (no proxy)
- journals.cambridge.org [5] (no proxy)
- umiacs.umd.edu
(no proxy) - umiacs.umd.edu [2] (no proxy)
- cambridge.org (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Precedent.Larry Alexander - 1996 - In Dennis M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell. pp. 493–503.
Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint.Gabriel L. Broughton - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (3):253-307.
Reasoning with inconsistent precedents.Ilaria Canavotto - forthcoming - Artificial Intelligence and Law:1-30.
Two factor-based models of precedential constraint: a comparison and proposal.Robert Mullins - 2023 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 31 (4):703-738.
A reduction-graph model of precedent in legal analysis.L. Karl Branting - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 150 (1-2):59-95.
Protected reasons and precedential constraint—erratum.Robert Mullins - 2020 - Legal Theory 26 (1):100-101.
Representing dimensions within the reason model of precedent.Adam Rigoni - 2018 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 26 (1):1-22.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
467 (#49,984)
6 months
24 (#162,510)
2009-01-28
Downloads
467 (#49,984)
6 months
24 (#162,510)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Reasoning with dimensions and magnitudes.John Horty - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 27 (3):309-345.
On the (in)significance of Hume’s Law.Samuele Chilovi & Daniel Wodak - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):633-653.
HYPO's legacy: introduction to the virtual special issue.T. J. M. Bench-Capon - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (2):205-250.
A factor-based definition of precedential constraint.John F. Horty & Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon - 2012 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2):181-214.
References found in this work
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-9b866bbb8-sfvjl uwo