Abstract
Anti-realism was first introduced by Michael Dummett. He famously preferred to reduce issues about common sense metaphysics to issues about our statements and especially assertions about a certain sort of subject matters, such as those about the past, the physical world, and so on. On the basis of his view of metaphysical problems, he believes that we should initially choose an appropriate model of meaning and a proper conception of the notion of truth applicable to such linguistic statements. By doing so, the dispute between realism and anti-realism can be rendered to a disagreement on the kind of meaning such statements may have. After criticizing the realist view, he goes on to claim that without having proper evidence, we cannot judge about the truth-value of our linguistic statements. To understand a sentence, according to Dummett, is to have the capacity of recognizing what would be counted as evidence for or against its truth. Therefore, an anti-realist believes that there can be no guarantee for every sentence to be true, independently of our epistemic capabilities and other relevant abilities. An advocate of realism, by contrast, admits the principle of bivalence and believes that all sentences are either true or false in terms of the reality which exists independently of us. In this essay, after introducing Dummett’s anti-realist view and his criticisms of realism, I am going to discuss the relationship between his desired theory of meaning and his view of anti-realism.