Topoi 10 (2):227-229 (1991)
R. C. Jeffrey has proposed probabilism as a solution to Hume's problem of justifying induction. This paper shows that the assumptions of his Estimation Theorem, used to justify induction, can be weakened to provide a more satisfactory interpretation. It is also questioned whether the use of probabilism adds significantly to our understanding (or even Hume's understanding) of the problem of induction.
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Does the Philosophy of Induction Rest on a Mistake?R. D. Rosenkrantz - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):78-97.
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