Plurals and complexes

Abstract
Atomism denies that complexes exist. Common-sense metaphysics may posit masses, composite individuals and sets, but atomism says there are only simples. In a singularist logic, it is difficult to make a plausible case for atomism. But we should accept plural logic, and then atomism can paraphrase away apparent reference to complexes. The paraphrases require unfamiliar plural universals, but these are of independent interest; for example, we can identify numbers and sets with plural universals. The atomist paraphrases would fail if plurals presuppose complexes: but an Appendix shows that reference to complexes is not required in the semantics of plurals.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/51.3.411
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,607
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question.Chad Carmichael - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
Composition.Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Where in the Relativistic World Are We?Cody Gilmore - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
80 ( #75,293 of 2,235,741 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #149,672 of 2,235,741 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature