A dilemma for Sinnott-Armstrong's moderate pyrrhonian moral scepticism

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):457–462 (2008)
Abstract
In order for us to have epistemic justification, Sinnott-Armstrong believes we do not have to be able to rule out all sceptical hypotheses. He suggests that it is sufficient if we have 'modestly justified beliefs', i.e., if our evidence rules out all non-sceptical alternatives. I argue that modest justification is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Either modest justification is independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses, but is not a kind of epistemic justification, or else modest justification is a kind of epistemic justification, but is not truly independent of our ability to rule out sceptical hypotheses.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.549.x
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References found in this work BETA
Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.

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Citations of this work BETA
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):463–470.
Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):478-488.

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Replies to Hough, Baumann and Blaauw.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):478-488.
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Moderate Classy Pyrrhonian Moral Scepticism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):448–456.
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