Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):159-77 (1997)
According to ‘internalism’, what mental states people are in depends wholly on what obtains inside their heads. This paper challenges that view without relying on arguments about the identity‐conditions of concepts that make up the content of mental states. Instead, it questions the internalist’s underlying assumption that, in Searle’s words, “the brain is all we have for the purpose of representing the world to ourselves”, which neglects the fact that human beings have used their brains to devise methods for extending and enhancing the brain’s own functions, in particular for storing information externally. Although Popper draws attention to this fact, he fails to grasp its psychological implications, concluding instead that there can be knowledge “without a knowing subject”, and so repeating the internalist’s mistake. With equal justice one can conclude, absurdly, that there are ownerless plans, resolutions and shopping‐lists. The paper goes on to meet possible internalist counter‐arguments
|Keywords||Content Epistemology External Mental Representation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
In Search of Clarity About Parity. [REVIEW]Michael Wheeler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):417 - 425.
Taking Responsibility for Cognitive Extension.Tom Roberts - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):1-11.
Whither Internalism? How Internalists Should Respond to the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.
You Do the Maths: Rules, Extension, and Cognitive Responsibility.Tom Roberts - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):133 - 145.
Similar books and articles
Content: Covariation, Control, and Contingency.J. Christopher Maloney - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
The Good, the Bad, and the Irrational: Three Views of Mental Content.Andrew E. Newman - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):95-106.
On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism.B. J. C. Madison - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.
Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content.Keith Butler - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.
Connecting Internal and External Representations: Spatial Transformations of Scientific Visualizations. [REVIEW]J. Gregory Trafton, Susan B. Trickett & Farilee E. Mintz - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (1):89-106.
Two Grades of Internalism (Pass and Fail).Andrew E. Newman - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169.
Representation and a Science of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.
Content Internalism About Indexical Thought.Michael Pelczar - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):95 - 104.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads70 ( #75,009 of 2,170,053 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #186,298 of 2,170,053 )
How can I increase my downloads?