American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):131-136 (2005)
It is an intuitively attractive view that the importance of a proposition affects the amount of evidence a subject needs in order to know that proposition—the more important the proposition is to the subject, the more evidence the subject must have in order for her to count as knowing the proposition. This paper argues that because unimportant propositions entail the falsity of very important propositions this position either results in the lack of closure of knowledge under known implication, or it results in standards for evidence being universally high.
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