Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):195 - 208 (1996)
This paper discusses the Bayesian updating rules of ordinary and Jeffrey conditionalisation. Their justification has been a topic of interest for the last quarter century, and several strategies proposed. None has been accepted as conclusive, and it is argued here that this is for a good reason; for by extending the domain of the probability function to include propositions describing the agent's present and future degrees of belief one can systematically generate a class of counterexamples to the rules. Dynamic Dutch Book and other arguments for them are examined critically. A concluding discussion attempts to put these results in perspective within the Bayesian approach.
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Citations of this work BETA
Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian Conditionalisation and Voluntarism.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):67-85.
Indifference, Neutrality and Informativeness: Generalizing the Three Prisoners Paradox.Sergio Wechsler, L. G. Esteves, A. Simonis & C. Peixoto - 2005 - Synthese 143 (3):255-272.
Dutch-Book Arguments Against Using Conditional Probabilities for Conditional Bets.Keith Hutchison - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):195.
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