Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):361-366 (2020)

Nathan Robert Howard
Texas A&M University
ABSTRACT Normativity seems characteristically, perhaps essentially, explained by claims about the competition between normative reasons. John Broome’s ‘quick objection’ aims to show that rationality cannot be explained by claims about normative reasons and, thus, that it is not normative. Broome’s objection turns on the idea that rationality is mind-dependent in a way that facts about reasons are not. However, this objection is shaped by a popular, powerful, and restrictive assumption about the substance of normative reasons called factualism, which holds that the substances that are reasons are facts, either in the sense of true propositions or of the truth-makers of such propositions. I suggest that support for factualism is weaker than its popularity suggests. In particular, I suggest that arguments for factualism from the nature of normative explanation, expressions attributing reasons, the relationship between normativity and actuality, and common sense are weaker than they appear. Rejecting factualism allows us to tie some class of reasons—subjective reasons, we might call them—more closely to the mind and to thereby ground the normativity of rationality. Thus, Broome’s ‘quick objection’ is too quick for it must account for the possibility of non-factualist reasons.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/24740500.2021.1964242
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,740
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The right and the good.W. Ross - 1932 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 39 (2):11-12.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436-443.
Rationality Versus Normativity.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):293-311.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rationality Versus Normativity.John Broome - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):293-311.
On Broome’s Notion of Normativity.Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):373-378.
The Bootstrapping Objection.Christian Piller - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):612-631.
Rationality and Kinds of Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):386-392.
Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle.Erik Carlson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.
Normativity From Rationality: A Comment on John Broome.Julia Markovits - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):343-352.
John Broome.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):332-342.
Comments on Broome’s ‘Rationality Versus Normativity’.Krister Bykvist - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):353-360.


Added to PP index

Total views
5 ( #1,183,617 of 2,462,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #144,426 of 2,462,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes