Foundationalism and arbitrariness

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):18–24 (2005)
Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
Keywords Foundationalism  epistemic regress  regress problem  infinitism  Peter Klein
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00212.x
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