In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. pp. 140--55 (2003)
AbstractPreprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on the background knowledge shared in common by nontheists and theists, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. Our aim is to argue against this proposition. We recognize that in doing so, we face a formidable challenge. It’s one thing to say that evil presents a reason for atheism that is, ultimately, overridden by arguments for theism. It’s another to say that it doesn’t so much as provide us with a reason for atheism in the first place. In order to make this latter claim seem initially more plausible, consider the apparent design of the mammalian eye or the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to support life. These are often proposed as reasons to believe in theism. Critics commonly argue not merely that these supposed reasons for theism are overridden by arguments for atheism but rather that they aren’t good reasons for theism in the first place. Our parallel proposal with respect to evil and atheism is, initially at least, no less plausible than this proposal with respect to apparent design and theism.
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Citations of this work
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Pain and pleasure: An evidential problem for theists.Paul Draper - 1989 - Noûs 23 (3):331-350.
Defenseless.Bruce Russell - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 193--205.
Some difficulties in theistic treatments of evil.Richard Gale - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder (ed.), The Evidential Argument From Evil. Indiana University Press. pp. 206--218.