Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy

Authors
Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University
Abstract
Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism
Keywords infallibilism  warrant  Gettier problem  epistemology  justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI ppr200366250
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
Warrant is Unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Accidentally True Belief and Warrant.Andrew Chignell - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
Plantinga and Favorable Mini-Environments.T. M. Botham - 2003 - Synthese 135 (3):431 - 441.
What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.
Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy.Feit Neil - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304–327.
Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
1,910 ( #437 of 2,272,742 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
224 ( #1,110 of 2,272,742 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature