Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327 (2003)
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Abstract

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism

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Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University

Citations of this work

How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.
Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.
Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.

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References found in this work

The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
"What Is Knowledge?".Linda Zagzebski - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 92-116.

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