Authors
Christopher Howard
McGill University
Abstract
Skepticism about the ‘wrong kind’ of reasons—the view that wrong-kind reasons are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes—is more often assumed than argued for. Jonathan Way sets out to remedy this: he argues that skeptics about, but not defenders of, wrong-kind reasons can explain a distinctive pattern of transmission among such reasons and claims that this fact lends significant support to the skeptical view. I argue that Way's positive case for wrong-kind reason skepticism fails. I conclude with an account of what's needed to resolve the debate between wrong-kind reason skeptics and defenders.
Keywords right‐kind reasons  wrong‐kind reasons  transmission of reasons  final value
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.193
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References found in this work BETA

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The Domain of Reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.
Equal Treatment for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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