In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Skepticism about the ‘wrong kind’ of reasons—the view that wrong-kind reasons are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes, but not reasons for those attitudes—is more often assumed than argued for. Jonathan Way sets out to remedy this: he argues that skeptics about, but not defenders of, wrong-kind reasons can explain a distinctive pattern of transmission among such reasons and claims that this fact lends significant support to the skeptical view. I argue that Way's positive case for wrong-kind reason skepticism fails. I conclude with an account of what's needed to resolve the debate between wrong-kind reason skeptics and defenders.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,031

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.
The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing.Laura Tomlinson Makin - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):106-126.
Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1455-1474.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, UK:
Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.


Added to PP

165 (#120,474)

6 months
15 (#184,854)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Howard
McGill University

Citations of this work

Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.
Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.
Fittingness.Christopher Howard - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12542.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Virtue, Vice, and Value.Thomas Hurka - 2001 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references