Authors
Nathan Robert Howard
Texas A&M University
Abstract
A major point of debate about morally good motives concerns an ambiguity in the truism that good and strong-willed people desire to do what is right. This debate is shaped by the assumption that “what’s right” combines in only two ways with “desire,” leading to distinct de dicto and de re readings of the truism. However, a third reading of such expressions is possible, first identified by Janet Fodor, which has gone wholly unappreciated by philosophers in this debate. I identify Fodor’s nonspecific reading of “desire to do what’s right” and briefly discuss its merits.
Keywords De Dicto Motivation   Judgment Externalism   Judgment Internalism   Non-specific De Re  Moral Motivation
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DOI 10.26556/jesp.v20i3.1249
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Acting for the Right Reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.

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Categorical Phenomenalism About Sexual Orientation.T. R. Whitlow & N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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