Maher, mendeleev and bayesianism

Philosophy of Science 58 (4):574-585 (1991)

Authors
Colin Howson
London School of Economics
Abstract
Maher (1988, 1990) has recently argued that the way a hypothesis is generated can affect its confirmation by the available evidence, and that Bayesian confirmation theory can explain this. In particular, he argues that evidence known at the time a theory was proposed does not confirm the theory as much as it would had that evidence been discovered after the theory was proposed. We examine Maher's arguments for this "predictivist" position and conclude that they do not, in fact, support his view. We also cast doubt on the assumptions of Maher's alleged Bayesian proofs
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DOI 10.1086/289641
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