Pragmatism and Correspondence

Philosophia 49 (2):685-704 (2020)
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Abstract

It is commonplace to describe the pragmatist conception of truth as incompatible with correspondence theory. This popular description relies on a deflationary reading of Peirce and James’s many apparent endorsements of correspondence. This reading says they regarded it as a mere platitude or truism, not as a substantive piece of philosophical theorizing. There are two main reasons typically offered in support of this platitude narrative – its consonance with Peirce’s original formulation of PT from 1878, and the objections that pragmatists frequently raised against various notions traditionally associated with CT. I argue that neither reason is compelling and that PT and CT are compatible conceptions of truth.

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Andrew Howat
California State University, Fullerton

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References found in this work

Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Ways of Worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Harvester Press.

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