Pragmatism and Correspondence

Philosophia 49 (2):685-704 (2020)
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It is commonplace to describe the pragmatist conception of truth as incompatible with correspondence theory. This popular description relies on a deflationary reading of Peirce and James’s many apparent endorsements of correspondence. This reading says they regarded it as a mere platitude or truism, not as a substantive piece of philosophical theorizing. There are two main reasons typically offered in support of this platitude narrative – its consonance with Peirce’s original formulation of PT from 1878, and the objections that pragmatists frequently raised against various notions traditionally associated with CT. I argue that neither reason is compelling and that PT and CT are compatible conceptions of truth.



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Andrew Howat
California State University, Fullerton

Citations of this work

Truth from the Agent Point of View.Matthew Shields - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1205-1225.

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References found in this work

Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Ways of worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Hassocks [Eng.]: Harvester Press.

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