Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):97-111 (2021)

Authors
Nathan Robert Howard
Texas A&M University
Abstract
I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
Keywords Davidson  Primary Reasons  Normative Reasons  Ambidextrous Reasons  Virtue
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DOI 10.5840/jphil202111828
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