Philosophical Forum 36 (3):221–242 (2005)

Authors
Leslie A. Howe
University of Saskatchewan
Abstract
I argue that understanding the self in terms of narrative construction does not preclude the possibility of error concerning one’s own self. Identity is a projection of first and second-order desires and a product of choice in relation to desire. Self-deceit appears in this connection as a response to an identity that one has constructed through choice and/or desire but not acknowledged in one’s self-account, reflecting a conflict between desires or a motivated failure to account. This analysis is applied primarily to acknowledgement of one’s sexual identity.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00202.x
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Deciding to Believe.Bernard Williams - 1970 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Narrative Explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
Lying to Oneself.Raphael Demos - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (18):588-595.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reflections on Competition and Nature Sports.Kevin Krein - 2015 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 9 (3):271-286.
Ludonarrative Dissonance and Dominant Narratives.Leslie A. Howe - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (1):44-54.

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