Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth

Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468 (2013)
Abstract
This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’
Keywords Peirce  Truth  Wittgenstein  Hinge Propositions  Regulative Ideas
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9351-6
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References found in this work BETA
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Words and Life.Hilary Putnam - 1994 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.

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