Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics
A recent article by Jeff Kochan contains a discussion of modus ponens that among other thing alleges that the paradox of the heap is a counterexample to it. In this note I show that it is the conditional major premise of a modus ponens inference, rather than the rule itself, that is impugned. This premise is the contrapositive of the inductive step in the principle of mathematical induction, confirming the widely accepted view that it is the vagueness of natural language predicates, not modus ponens , that is challenged by Sorites
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DOI 10.1080/02698590903007188
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References found in this work BETA

A Counterexample to Modus Ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.
Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.
Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
Logic with Trees.C. Howson - 1999 - Studia Logica 63 (1):140-143.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Exception Makes the Rule: Reply to Howson.Jeff Kochan - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):213-216.

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