Synthese 81 (1):1 - 8 (1989)
This paper addresses the problem of why the conditions under which standard proofs of the Dutch Book argument proceed should ever be met. In particular, the condition that there should be odds at which you would be willing to bet indifferently for or against are hardly plausible in practice, and relaxing it and applying Dutch book considerations gives only the theory of upper and lower probabilities. It is argued that there are nevertheless admittedly rather idealised circumstances in which the classic form of the Dutch Book argument is valid.
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References found in this work BETA
Confirmation and the Dutch Book Argument.Patricia Baillie - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):393-397.
On Rational Betting Systems.Ernest W. Adams - 1964 - Archiv für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagenforschung 6:7-29.
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