Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (3):300-314 (2017)
AbstractThis paper refines a number of theoretical distinctions relevant to deceptive play, in particular the difference between merely misleading actions and types of simulation commonly considered beyond the pale, such as diving. To do so, I rely on work in the philosophy of language about conversational convention and implicature, the distinction between lying and misleading, and their relation to concepts of seduction and bullshit. The paper works through a number of possible solutions to the question of what is wrong with simulation and its difference from strategic fouling, including the argument that games and their rules operate like contracts. I conclude that the wrongness lies in the injustice of unfair advantage gained through actions that silence opposition by resort to unanswerable play.
Similar books and articles
Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit.Hans Maes & Katrien8 Schaubroeck - 2006 - In Hardcastle Reisch (ed.), Bullshit and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court.
Our vision and our mission: Bullshit, assertion and belief.Ben Kotzee - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):163-175.
Raising the tone: Definition, bullshit, and the definition of bullshit.Andrew Aberdein - 2006 - In G. Reisch & G. Hardcastle (eds.), Bullshit and Philosophy. Open Court. pp. 151-169.
The Distinctive Wrong in Lying.Alan Strudler - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171-179.
A P.S. on B.S.: Some Remarks on Humbug and Bullshit.Michael Wreen - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):105-115.
Steering Clear of Bullshit? The Problem of Obscurantism.Viktor Ivanković - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):531-546.
A New Take on Deceptive Advertising: Beyond Frankfurt’s Analysis of ‘BS’.Andrew Johnson - 2010 - Business and Professional Ethics Journal 29 (1-4):5-32.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.
References found in this work
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.