Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564 (2006)

Authors
Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University
E. J. Coffman
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Abstract
Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
Keywords foundationalism  epistemology  Ernest Sosa  Peter Klein  infinitism  epistemic regress  regress problem  regress
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Reprint years 2006
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2007.0003
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References found in this work BETA

There is Immediate Justification.James Pryor - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 181--202.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):297-325.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shifting the Burden of Proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.
Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness.Coos Engelsma - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):192-200.

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