Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201 (2016)

Christopher Howard
McGill University
A central dispute in the ethics of belief concerns what kinds of considerations can be reasons for belief. Nishi Shah has recently argued that the correct explanation of transparency in doxastic deliberation—the psychological phenomenon that only considerations taken to bear on the truth of p can be deliberated from to conclude in believing that p—settles this debate in favor of strict evidentialism, the view that only evidence can be a reason for belief. I argue that Shah’s favored explanation of transparency fails to imply this result—that it leaves open the possibility that there can be non-evidential reasons for belief. The upshot is that practical non-evidentialists—those who hold that there are at least some non-evidential, practical reasons for belief—can happily accept the fact of transparency, and Shah’s explanation of it, without having to abandon their view.
Keywords Reasons for belief  Evidentialism  Non-evidentialism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0524-z
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References found in this work BETA

Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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