Erkenntnis 34 (1):73 - 82 (1991)
Recent arguments of Watkins, one purporting to show the impossibility of probabilistic induction, and the other to be a solution of the practical problem of induction, are examined and two are shown to generate inconsistencies in his system. The paper ends with some reflections on the Bayesian theory of inductive inference.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.
Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
An Application of Information Theory to the Problem of the Scientific Experiment.Massimiliano Badino - 2004 - Synthese 140 (3):355 - 389.
On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson.Daniel Steel - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (3):285 - 291.
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction.John D. Norton - 2013 - Synthese 191 (4):1-20.
Bayesian Induction IS Eliminative Induction.James Hawthorne - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
Machine Learning and the Foundations of Inductive Inference.F. Bergadano - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):31-51.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads45 ( #110,431 of 2,143,796 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #387,161 of 2,143,796 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.