Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30 (3-4):451-467 (2003)

Authors
Yong Huang
Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract
This article attempts to see whether value can be independent of fact. I argue that, in this regard, the two traditional models of ethics, Kant's deontology and Bentham/Mill's utilitarianism are both faulty. In comparison, while contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics does seem more promising, I argue that such a version of virtue ethics is still deficient. The main purpose of this article is to develop an alternative version of virtue ethics, what I call neo-Confucian ontological virtue ethics, drawing on Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi's identification of virtue and nature, which provides a negative answer to our question without committing the 'naturalist fallacy'
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DOI 10.1111/jocp.2003.30.issue-3-4
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